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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC 
CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Appeal No. 20110037 
—000O000— 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-3-102 and §78A-3-103. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue Number 1: Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered 
admissions as admitted when the method of service was at issue. 
Issue Number 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered 
admissions as admitted when the admissions improperly sought admissions to legal 
conclusions. 
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Issue Number 3: Whether or not the trial court erred because it failed to recognize 
the legal effect of the admissions admitted in that said admissions were not determinative. 
Issue Number 4: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Appellant's 
Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. 
Issue Number 5: Whether or not the trial court erred in striking Appellant's 
Affidavit in Support of its opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Issue Number 6: Whether or not the trial court erred in granting Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE 
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
included in an Addendum hereto include: 
1. URCP 5 (b)(l)(A)(ii); and 
2. URCP 56(c). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Fifth District Court, 
Washington County, granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and an unfiled 
Motion to Deem Admissions as Admitted. This is an action pursuant to Breach of 
Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraud, and Fraud in the Inducement; seeking 
compensation for an offer of employment that was sent to the Appellant to be employed, 
as a teacher at the Appellee's school and then later revoked and offered at a significantly 
lower amount. 
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The trial court found, over objection of Appellant's counsel that propounded 
discovery had been properly served, deemed Appellant's admissions as admitted, and 
then granted summary judgment for the Appellee based on those admissions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background 
On or about April 29, 2009 Appellant, Steven Van Den Eikhof, received an Offer 
of Employment in writing from Appellee, Vista School, a Utah Public Charter School 
(Vista) signed by Steven H. Goodman (Goodman), Principal of Vista. The "base salary" 
(Addendum Number 4) in the original offer sent by the Appellee to the Appellant was for 
$34,622.00. The offer also mentioned a benefits and a retirement package in addition to 
the base salary mentioned. Appellee instructed Appellant to sign the offer if he accepted 
same and return the signed offer to Vista by May 1, 2009. Appellant signed the offer and 
delivered it as instructed, hereby accepting the offer on May 1, 2009. 
Appellant also completed all other "requirements" (if any existed) for acceptance 
of employment such as providing a copy of his teaching certificate; proof of legal 
citizenship; and the passing of a criminal background check. At the behest of Vista, 
Appellant also attended teacher training observations in California in June of 2009 and 
teacher training in August of 2009. 
Appellant planned to start the fall school year with Vista School as a teacher 
relying on the original contract terms, as agreed upon in May of that year. However, 
Appellee sent Appellant (and all other Vista teachers) a new, and reduced, contract offer. 
This new offer was seemingly sent at a strategic time, after the Washington County 
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School District had already begun the new school year, thus making it impossible for any 
teacher to find other employment as a teacher in the area. Appellant was required to sign 
this new agreement in order to continue employment with Vista. 
The new contract offer had a base salary of $30,576.65 which was $4,045.35 less 
than the original offer. (Addendum Number 5) In addition, other benefits were omitted. 
Appellant refused to accept the new offer. The Appellant had left a school nearer his 
home in order to make more money as offered in the original offer of employment. In 
reality, the new, reduced offer was lower than the job from which Appellant was 
recruited. Appellant hired an attorney to negotiate with the principal of the school. At the 
negotiation, it was determined that Appellant was constructively terminated from his 
position with Vista due to his failure to accept the reduced offer. 
Procedural Facts 
On May 19, 2011, Appellee sent an email to Appellant stating that discovery 
requests were attached and that the "originals" would follow in the mail. (Addendum 
Number 6) Appellant filed the email electronically, virtually ignoring it, due to the fact 
that actual service of the documents was supposed to be imminent. In addition, no 
agreement had been reached in regard to service by email and Appellant logically 
assumed that the email was a "heads up" or a courtesy. 
Apparently, Appellee's secretary signed a Certificate of Service alleging that the 
discovery "originals" were sent on May 20, 2011. Whether due to a mistake by this 
secretary or by the postal service, these discovery papers never arrived at the office of 
Appellant's counsel. 
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Appellant received a Motion for Summary Judgment wherein counsel for Appellee 
included a statement: "Accordingly [due to the Appellant's failure to answer admissions], 
the following facts from Vista's Requests for Admissions are conclusively deemed 
admitted." (Addendum Number 7, Pg. 2) Appellant's counsel immediately called 
Appellee's counsel to inform him of the mistake in service of the original propounded 
discovery and to request time to answer. Defense counsel refused to extend any time to 
answer the improperly served discovery or to acknowledge that a mistake might have 
been made by his office or the post office. 
Appellant's counsel filed the appropriate motions to amend or withdraw as well as 
an opposition memorandum to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court was 
visually upset with the arguments by Appellant and stated three times in open court that 
Appellant's counsel had used "unprofessional" language. (Addendum Number 8: Pg. 9, 
Line 24; Pg. 12, Line 7; and Pg. 12, Line 21). The judge then deemed all admissions as 
admitted, struck Appellee's affidavit in support of its opposition to the Summary 
Judgment, and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment despite the fact that a 
clear contract had been formed with the self-labeled "offer of employment" and 
subsequent acceptance. 
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I 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Deeming Admissions as Admitted: Inadequate Service (Issue One) 
First and foremost, the Appellee never filed a Motion to Deem Admissions as 
Admitted with the trial court. (Addendum Number 9) < 
Appellee claims to have served discovery requests via email and First Class Mail. 
The trial court judge stated from the bench that email was good service (Addendum 
Number 8, Pg. 11, Lines 16-17). Although Appellant freely admitted at the trial court 
level that the email had been received, there was never any argument that the parties had 
agreed to service by email. Furthermore, the email clearly stated that "originals" would 
follow in the mail. Relying upon the wording in the email and not having agreed to 
electronic service, as required by URCP 5 (b)(l)(A)(ii), Appellant electronically viewed a 
settlement offer (attached to the same email) and then filed the email anticipating the 
originals via mail. To this day, the discovery still has not arrived via mail. 
Allowing Admissions that were Legal Conclusions (Issue Two) 
Many of the admissions requested were not admissible according to case law. 
Some of the requests were in complete contradiction to the offer of employment letter on 
file with the court. Ironically, when the trial court judge was asked if he has seen the 
letter in question, he replied that he had not. Regardless of whether or not the trial court 
took this document into consideration, the fact of the matter is that the trial court should 
have, as both parties admitted that Appellee had given to the Appellant the document and 
that the Appellant had signed it in the place where it said :ACCEPTED AND AGREED". 
Therefore, even if the trial court was correct in allowing the admissions and legal 
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conclusions, the trial court was incorrect in allowing the deemed admissions to overcome 
the simple fact that a contractual document was on file with the court. In other words, 
parties cannot "admit" that the four corners of a document are anything more or less than 
the actual document shows within its four corners. 
Trial Court's Failure to Recognize the Legal Effect of Deeming Admissions as 
Non-Determinative (Issue Three) 
Even if the trial court was correct in deeming the admissions as admitted and 
every admission was "admittable" according to case law, the admissions were not 
determinative enough to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment in light of the offer of 
employment on file with the court. 
Denial of Motion to Amend/Withdraw (Issue Four) 
The trial court abused its discretion when it disallowed the Motion to Amend or 
Withdraw. The Appellee argued the case of Langelandv. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 
P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998) citing the two-step process used to determine whether a request to 
withdraw or amend admissions should be granted. The Appellant argues that this Motion 
to Amend or Withdraw was solely about proper notice and service and therefore the two-
step process was not applicable. 
Striking Affidavit in Support (Issue Five) 
The trial court then struck an affidavit in support of the opposition to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. No finding was made or reason given for this other than the trial 
court now felt that this opposition was moot in light of the admissions being deemed as 
admitted. 
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Granting Motion for Summary Judgment (Issue Six) 
The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment based solely on the fact 
that the admissions were deemed as admitted. Given the myriad of objections and 
problems listed above, the granting of the Motion of Summary judgment would not have 
happened "but for" the other errors. The admissions were simply not enough to overcome 
the factual dispute of whether or not the document in question was an "offer of 
employment" and therefore Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment should not have 
been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue Number 1: Inadequate Service 
Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered admissions as 
admitted when the method of service was at issue. 
An email was sent from opposing counsel with attachments requesting discovery 
i 
on May 19, 2010. The email expressly stated that originals would follow in the mail. 
(Addendum Number 6). Appellant's counsel viewed the settlement offer attached thereto 
and then electronically filed the email from opposing counsel relying on the statement in < 
the email that the originals would follow in the mail. There were no requests or 
agreements to accept service by email. Appellant did not calendar the time to answer the 
discovery as the discovery had not yet been properly served. To this day, Appellant is 
unaware as to whether the email files are even the same documents as the files that were 
allegedly mailed. Had Appellant remembered that the email had come, he could have 
called opposing counsel and asked for the originals, thus avoiding this entire appeal. 
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However, that was not the case and Appellant's counsel had no duty to follow up with 
opposing counsel regarding an email alluding to discovery that was never sent/received. 
The originals were never properly served even though opposing counsel had a 
Certificate of Service dated May 20, 2011. In fact, Appellant did not know that the 
discovery was alleged to be served until counsel received Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment which stated therein that the Admissions were conclusively deemed 
admitted. (Addendum Number 7, Pg. 2) 
Defense counsel immediately contacted opposing counsel to discuss the service 
issue and attempt to resolve it as no other deadlines had been missed on the case and it 
was clearly an issue that could have been resolved with a simple extension of time. 
Opposing counsel refused this simple request. 
Despite no agreement that service could be effectuated via email, the trial court 
held Appellant to a knowledge of service due to this email even though there was clearly 
no agreement to accept electronic service. The hearing transcript (Addendum Number 8) 
on page 11 states the following: "The evidence proves conclusively that the plaintiff 
received the discovery request by e-mail, and the appellate courts have held that having 
this notice of this sort, [sic] not specifically e-mail but clear actual notice that discovery 
requests were present, gave the plaintiff a duty to respond in some way, to do something 
other than just nothing." (Id. at Pg. 11, Lines 14-19). 
This finding by the Court is clearly erroneous when coupled with the Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure URCP 5 (b)(l)(A)(ii) which restricts service via email to persons that 
have "agreed to accept service by email". 
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In regard to service by First Class Mail, the trial court judge found by a 
"preponderance of the evidence... that defendant's discovery was served on plaintiffs 
attorney by mail." (Id. at Pg. 11, Line 10) The judge further stated that the "evidence in 
that regard is just much too clear to ignore." (Id. at Pg. 11, Lines 10-13) In actuality, the 
only evidence presented was a Certificate of Service which had the May 20, 2010 date on 
it. With Appellant's admitting that the email was sent and then stating that the discovery 
had not been seen until the Motion for Summary Judgment had been filed, there was 
more evidence to the contrary than "clear evidence" of service as referred to by Judge 
Beacham. In fact, there was substantial argument to the contrary to the point that 
Appellant's counsel was accused by the judge of being unprofessional when he typed in 
the following in all capital letters: "Plaintiffs counsel knows for a fact that discovery was 
not sent." Although the quote should properly read that Plaintiffs counsel knows that 
discovery was not received, the point remains. 
The Judge was later told by Appellant's counsel that the discovery attachments to 
the email were never opened. The court responded that "I guess the answer why [one 
should open those attachments] is the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have both 
said, well, you know, if you knew there was discovery, you better do something about it. 
It seems a little harsh rule to most of us, but that's what they said." (Id. at Pg. 17, Lines 7-
11) 
In reality, Appellant can locate no case wherein the Court of Appeals or the Utah 
Supreme Court has ever held that a person is responsible to answer discovery propounded 
by email absent an agreement to accept electronic service. There are attorneys that do not 
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even use email that practice all over the state of Utah and to find that discovery can be 
sent in this fashion absent an agreement is clearly erroneous. 
For a judge to impose summary judgment on a case where no motion or pleading 
had heretofore gone unanswered and find that discovery had been sent when counsel 
clearly had stated that he had not received it (other than in the email) is against the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence. 
Issue Number 2: Admission Requests for Legal Conclusions 
Whether or not the trial court erred in deeming unanswered admissions as 
admitted when the admissions improperly sought admissions to legal conclusions. 
There were two admissions that called for legal conclusions and could not be 
"admitted" by the Appellant. Furthermore, these admission requests, the form of which, 
were addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Or. Inc., 702 
P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985) where the Court concluded that "'Admit you lose' type 
requests, or requests to admit legal conclusions, are objectionable and not a proper basis 
for admission." (Id. at 100). 
The admissions in this case are attached hereto as Addendum Number 10. 
Specifically, Appellant cites requests numbers 3 and 12: 
"Admission No. 3: Please admit that the Vista Letter states 
that it did not serve as a formal employment agreement." 
"Admission No. 12: Please admit that the total amount of 
compensation in the proposed Salary Agreement exceeded the 
total amount of compensation state din the Vista Letter." 
Admission number 3 is essentially the crux of the entire case—whether or not the 
original offer of employment letter was actually an offer of employment as the letter 
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states. For some reason, Appellee has argued that this self-proclaimed document is not 
what it purports to be. It is impossible for Appellant to "admit" that this legal document 
(Addendum Number 4) is not a legal document and not an offer of employment. Note 
that the first line of this letter clearly states that "I am pleased to extend you this offer of 
employment." (Id.) 
This request for admission is the exact type of admission contemplated by the 
Supreme Court in Jensen where the Supreme Court held that even admissions that were 
admitted due to a failure to respond sometimes need the court's intervention due to equity 
concerns: "It is the last of these admissions that requires the intervention of this Court as 
a matter of law." Jensen at 702 P.2d at 101. 
Issue Number 3: Trial Court's Failure to Recognize the Legal Effect of Deeming , 
Admissions as Non-Determinative 
Whether or not the trial court erred because it failed to recognize the legal effect of 
the admissions admitted and conclusively established. 
Even if the trial court was correct in constructively deeming the admissions as 
admitted and every admission was "admittable" despite the holding in Jensen, the i 
admissions were not determinative enough to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment in 
light of the offer of employment on file with the court. 
i 
The admissions admitted exactly 32 items. The admissions that seem to be 
determinative for the issue of this appeal are the following: 
Number 3: Admission that the Vista Letter States that it did not serve as a formal 
employment agreement. 
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Number 5: Admission that the Vista Letter provides that Appellant had to sign a 
Salary Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School. 
Number 9: Admission that the Vista Letter stated a base salary (emphasis added) 
was $34,622 with no additional compensation listed. 
Number 11: Admission that the proposed Salary Agreement [not the original 
offer] provided for a salary of $35,626 after calculating for Educator Salary 
Adjustments and compensation for professional development and training days. 
If the Appellate Court finds that the trial court did not err by admitting these 
admissions, Appellant alternatively argues that the trial court did err when it found that 
the 32 admissions were dispositive. All of the above admissions could be true and the 
Appellant's case remains a fact question for the trier of fact. 
The "base salary" mentioned in admission number 9 and the total salary listed in 
admission number 11 are not at odds with each other. When $35,626 was proposed, the 
state had included (subsequent to the original agreement) the $2,000 Educator Salary 
Adjustment that is paid by the state. In addition, the teachers were to receive $850 for the 
"training days" that they had already completed and for which they had not yet been paid. 
Thus, the subsequent offer was actually lower than the first offer as the Appellant has 
always alleged. At a minimum, this is another fact question at issue. 
The entire factual issue on this case revolved around two things: 
1. Did an offer exist? 
2. Did the subsequent offer match the first offer? 
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For the trial court to find that there was no genuine issue of material fact, Judge 
Beacham must have found that Appellant accepted an offer, went to training, and then 
rejected a higher salary offer. Even if all of the admissions were admitted, the admissions 
were not dispositive of the case and at least two issues of material fact still existed. 
Issue Four: Denial of Motion to Amend/Withdraw 
Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Amend or 
Withdraw Admissions. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it disallowed the Motion to Amend or 
Withdraw Admissions. Case law requires a two-step process to determine whether or not 
a Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions should be granted. These steps are outlined 
in Langelandv. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998): 
In the first step, we review the trial court's determinations as 
to whether amendment or withdrawal would serve the 
presentation of the merits and whether amendment or 
withdrawal would result in prejudice to the nonmoving party. 
In the second step, we review the trial court's discretion to 
grant or deny the motion. It is the finding of prejudice that 
was missing at the trial court level. 
The Appellee argues that Appellant should have addressed this "two pronged test" 
specifically. The trial court held that "The Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence by 
affidavit or otherwise of specific facts showing any admissions to be untrue." 
In fact Appellant/Plaintiff did not address the admissions at all except to attempt to 
argue that the admissions had never been properly served in the first place. While the 
analysis in the Langeland case argued by Appellee would seem to show that Appellant 
should have argued the two-pronged test, Appellant's motion was providing an argument 
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that precedes any analysis required by Langeland and therefore, Appellant argues that 
Langeland does not apply to a situation where the Admissions were admitted without 
proper service to the opposing party. 
Issue Five: Striking Affidavit in Support 
Whether or not the trial court erred in striking Appellant's Affidavit in Support of 
its opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court then struck an affidavit in support of the Opposition to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The affidavit in support of the original opposition to Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was inadvertently not filed with the court with the 
original opposition. However, when Plaintiff/Appellant discovered this mistake, the 
affidavit of the Appellant was filed with the court. The Appellee filed a Motion to Strike 
based on the failure to file the affidavit with the original opposition paperwork. 
The trial court agreed with Appellee and held the following: "That's improper in a 
reply memorandum. The party's not allowed to meet its initial burden by waiting until 
opposing counsel responds and then doing what was required in the first place." 
(Addendum Number 8, Page 11, Lines 6-9) 
In actuality, there is no case law that Appellant can find that addresses the late 
filing of an affidavit in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment. The filing of this 
affidavit after the fact did not prejudice or harm the Appellee, but simply reaffirmed to 
the court that the facts outlined in the opposition were sworn to by the 
Plaintiff/Appellant. The Appellee still had adequate notice and time to address the actual 
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facts alleged in the opposition and the failure in regard to timing was merely harmless 
error. 
Regardless of the finding of the Appellate Court in regard to this affidavit, the 
obvious factual dispute in this case cannot be overridden by the failure to timely file an 
affidavit in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Issue Six: Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment due to the adequacy of the findings. 
The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that 
the admissions were deemed as admitted and the response to the proposed Motion for 
Summary Judgment lacked "any affidavit, any discovery or any other relevant materials." 
(Addendum Number 8, Page 12, Lines 4-6). 
The question for summary judgment is whether or not there exists any issue of 
i 
material fact (URCP § 56). The court held that "[n]o genuine issue of material fact 
appears in regard to defendant's motion for summary judgment." (Addendum Number 8, 
Page 12, Line 7-8) Ironically, the court also found in the same hearing that "the Court < 
could not possibly determine there are no genuine issues of material fact..." (Addendum 
Number 8, Pg. 10, Lines 3-4) In fact, the two greatest issues of material fact still 
i 
remained—regardless of whether or not the Court was looking at the Plaintiff s or the 
Defendant's paperwork. These issues revolved around the question of whether or not the 
original offer of employment was an offer and whether or not the second offer of 
employment was greater than or less than the first offer. 
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It was very clear that Judge Beacham hold to a Motion for Summary Judgment 
standard that is admittedly not in line with the Court of Appeals and that normally used 
by other courts. In fact, the trial judge held that "The way that I apply summary judgment 
is according to the rules as I read them. I understand that that's not going to be your 
experience everywhere. In particular if you go to the Court of Appeals, heaven only 
knows what their rules regarding summary judgment are... I don't know what the rules 
are up there... I feel like if we're going to do that, then we've got to stick to that rule, and 
that's where the appellate court decisions really bother me..." (Addendum Number 8, 
Pages 18-19) 
In other words, the trial judge clearly has his own method of determining what a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and an Opposition to that motion should have in them. 
The unfortunate fact is that most attorneys are far more familiar with the standards as 
held in decades of case law where one issue of genuine fact defeats a Motion for 
Summary Judgment instead of the procedural strategies that can be used in order to urge 
courts to ignore material fact issues. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the two greatest issues before the court have still not been addressed: 
1) Does a contract exist? and 2) did the subsequent salary agreement (second offer) from 
Vista match the first offer of employment? 
The admissions were never properly served in this case and the subsequent 
findings of the trial court based on the finding that service was proper should all be 
reversed and remanded back to the trial court. 
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Because of this fact, Appellant asks the Appellate Court for the following: 
1. To reverse the decision of the trial court and find that service of the original 
requests for admissions was not properly served by email; 
2. To reverse the decision of the trial court that the service was effectuated by 
any other means; 
3. To reverse the decision of the trial court that the admissions are deemed 
admitted; 
4. To reverse the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Appellee; 
5. To reverse the decision of the trial court striking the Affidavit of Appellant 
in Opposition to the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
6. To reverse the trial court's denial of the Appellant's Motion to Amend or 
Withdraw Admissions; and 
7. To remand this case for further proceedings on the matters of the case 
therein. 
DATED t h i s ^ I day of June, 2011. i 
Respectfully Submitted, 
B R ^ ^ T ^ D A M S O N , 
^fie Justice Firm Legal, LLC 
Attorney for Appellant 
( 
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, 
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other than one 
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar 
paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served 
with all pleadings and papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing 
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment 
under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default 
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, in which no person is named as 
defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or 
appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at 
the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(b)(1) If a party is represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. If an attorney has filed a Notice of 
Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a matter within the 
scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and the party. 
(b)(1)(A) If a hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, the party shall 
use the method most likely to give prompt actual notice of the hearing. Otherwise, a party 
shall serve a paper under this rule: 
(b)(1)(A)(i) upon any person with an electronic filing account who is a party or attorney in 
the case by submitting the paper for electronic filing; 
(b)(1)(A)(ii) by sending it by email to the person's last known email address if that person 
has agreed to accept service by email; 
(b)(1)(A)(iii) by faxing it to the person's last known fax number if that person has agreed to 
accept service by fax; 
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(b)(1)(A)(iv) by mailing it to the person's last known address; 
(b)(1)(A)(v) by handing it to the person; 
(b)(1)(A)(vi) by leaving it at the person's office with a person in charge or leaving it in a 
receptacle intended for receiving deliveries or in a conspicuous place; or 
(b)(1)(A)(vii) by leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a 
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending. Service by electronic 
means is not effective if the party making service learns that the attempted service did not 
reach the person to be served. 
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a judgment 
signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served 
by the party preparing it; and 
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large 
number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of 
the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the 
defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff 
constitutes notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be served upon the 
parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed 
with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service completed by 
the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related to discovery. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. A party may file with the clerk of court using any means of 
delivery permitted by the court. The court may require parties to file electronically with an 
electronic filing account. Filing is complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic 
filing system, the clerk of court or the judge. The filing date shall be noted on the paper. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 36. Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. 
(a)(1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of the 
truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the 
application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The request for admission shall 
contain a notice advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted 
unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court 
may allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made 
available for inspection and copying. Without leave of court or written stipulation, requests for admission may not be served 
before the time specified in Rule 26(d). 
(a)(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty 
days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is 
directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the 
party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections 
before the expiration of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection is made, the reasons therefor 
shall be stated. The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot 
truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith 
requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so 
much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a 
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily 
obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission has 
been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he may, subject to the 
provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
(a)(3) The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless 
the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer 
does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be 
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made at a pretrial conference or 
at a designated time prior to trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits 
withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the 
court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is 
not an admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, 
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmiatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
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VISTA 
•/. mmmaam ; 
Date: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 
Steve Van Den Eikhof 
3396 Sugar Leo Road 
St George, Utah 84790 
Dear Mr. Van Den Eikhof: 
On behalf of Vista School, I am pleased to extend to you this offer of employment. This letter confirms your offer, 
but does not serve as a formal employment agreement. Once you have fulfilled the conditions indicated below, you 
will complete the actual hiring process and sign a "Salary Agreement" as well as the paperwork necessary for the 
benefits described below. 
Vista offers you abase salary of $34,622 per year. You will also be eligible for Ml benefits^ including group 
medical benefits and to participate in Vista's retirement plan. Please contact Human Resources at # 435-632-6396 
for more details about these plate. 
In order for you to accept this offer, you will heed to provide the following items to Vista's Human Resources (via 
e-mail to: sdbrook2@beyondbb.coni): 
J3 For purposes of federal immigration law, you will be required to provide documentary evidence of your 
identity and eligibility for employment in the United States. 
J3 You are also required to provide us with evidence of your state teaching license, if applicable to your 
position. 
J3 All employees are also required to complete a criminal background check. (A copy of your current 
teaching license will fulfill this requirement also.) 
To assist us in protecting the*confidentiality of your agreement with Vista, we would request that you not disclose, 
either directly or indirectly, any infoftnMfoh, including any of the terms of this letter regarding salary, to any 
person, including other Vista employees, other than members of your immediate family and any legal, tax or 
accounting specialists who provide you with individual legal, tax or accounting advice. 
Your employment with Vista will be on ail "at will" basis. By signing and returning this letter, you indicate your 
acceptance of this offer, your agreement to complete the required items above, and your agreement to complete the 
paperwork necessary to formalize your employment with Vista School. 
Please sign this letter and return it (via e-mail to: sdbrook2@bevondbb.com) by Friday, May 1,2009. We're 
excited to invite you on board and hope you feel the same. 1 look forward to working with you. 
Sincerely, 
Steven H. Goodman - Principal, Vista School 
ACCEPTED AND AGREED 
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SALARY/WAGE AGREEMENT-^EACHEB. 
SECTION ONE 
PARTIES AND POLICIES 
A. This Salary/Wage Agreement ("Agreement") is between Steve Van Den Eikhof 
("Employee") and Vista School ("School" or "Vista") a charter school located in 
Washington County, Utah, during the period of the 2009-2010 school year. This 
Agreement identifies the dollar amount Employee will be paid for work, and how 
payment will be made. This Agreement does not represent a guarantee of work for the 
entire period specified above. 
B. This Agreement represents the entire agreement regarding wages or salary between 
Employee and Vista. This Agreement supersedes any other agreement, either written 
or verbal. Vista is an at-will employer, and this Agreement should not be construed to 
represent a contract. Either party to this Agreement may terminate the employment at 
any time with or without notice, for any legal reason, or for no reason. 
C. Employee will follow School policies as outlined in the Employee Handbook, Policy 
Manual, Job Description, written memos and emails, and any other documents and 
policies that School has adopted or may adopt at any time. Vista may change policies 
pertaining to Employee from time to time, but will never change its at-will 
employment policy outlined in Part B above, and in the Employee Handbook. 
SECTION TWO 
ASSIGNMENT AND SCHEDULE 
Employee will perform work as outlined in the Job description. By signing this Agreement, 
Employee is also acknowledging receipt of the Job Description and agrees to perform work as 
described in that document, and as directed by the School Director. This Agreement is in effect 
only during Employee's proposed teaching assignment of 5th Grade Teacher, including 
additional secondary assignments based on School's need as determined by School Director. 
Employee will teach assigned classes on campus during the regular school day, and is 
required to be on campus from 8:00 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. on school days, and on campus during 
these additional times as scheduled by school administration: 
• Parent/Teacher Conferences 
• Up to 5 teacher training days 
• Occasional after school assemblies and/or activities related to grade(s)/subject(s) 
taught 
• Regular student performances 
• As needed to meet with parents or school administration 
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Employee will complete non-teaching tasks (preparation, correction, coordination, grading, 
etc.) either on or off campus. 
Employee is exempt from overtime pay, and may be regularly required to work extended 
hours to complete work as outlined in the job description. 
SECTION THREE 
WAGES AND SALARY 
For the work outlined in the Job Description, performed over 180 school days and up to 5 
training days, Employee will be paid $30,576.65 in base salary, plus an additional $4,200 based 
on legislative Educator Salary Adjustments, plus an additional $849.35 for attending professional 
development and training days for total compensation of $35,626. Payments will be in amounts 
equal to 1/12 of total compensation. If Employee's employment is terminated prior to the end of 
the Agreement period, or if Employee is on unpaid leave at any time during the agreement 
period, salary will be prorated proportionate to the number of days worked out of the 180 
scheduled days, and the final, prorated payment will be made on the regular pay day for the pay 
period that includes the date of termination or the beginning of unpaid leave. 
SECTION FOUR. 
OTHER. BENEFITS AND COMPENSATION 
A. Employees that are scheduled to work 30 or more hours per week during the school 
year currently accrue personal leave as explained in the employee handbook. This 
leave can be used to offset required teaching or on-campus time missed due to illness 
or other personal reasons. 
B. Vista Employees who are scheduled to work 30 or more hours per week during the 
school year are currently eligible for group health benefits. Refer tfc information in the 
health benefits enrollment packet and the Employee Handbook for details. 
C. Employees age 21 or older are currently eligible to participate in Vista's retirement 
program after 90 days of employment. Refer to the Retirement Program Booklet for 
details and options. 
SECTION FIVE 
EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS CHECKOUT 
Employee will use Vista's property, equipment, and materials in performing the duties associated 
with Employee's job. Vista uses a documented checkout process to track its property, and 
Employee is required to follow that process to receive foil compensation according to this 
Agreement upon termination of employment, whether it may be at Employee's will or at the will 
of the School. If Employee does not participate in this process or if School items checked out to 
Employee are missing or damaged at this checkout, School may deduct replacement, repair costs 
and/or cleaning fees from Employee's compensation. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SECTION SIX 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The terms of this agreement are confidential between Employee and Vista. Neither party shall 
discuss the terms of this agreement with other Vista employees or other parties that do not, by 
Vista's definition, have a business need to know. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Vista will 
provide information related to educator salaries as required by law. 
SECTION SEVEN 
ATTEST 
Vista is an at-will employer. This Agreement should not be construed to represent a contract. 
Either party to this Agreement may terminate the employment at any time with or without notice, 
for any legal reason, or for no reason. Neither party shall have any claim for wages or services 
beyond the termination date. 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with regard to salary or 
wages. This Agreement supersedes any other agreement regarding salary or wages, either 
written or verbal. 
If any portion of this Agreement is deemed by a court of competent jurisdiction to be 
nonbinding, it shall not affect any other portion of said Agreement. 
The parties below understand and agree to the above. 
[Employee] [Phone] [Date] 
[Address] 
[Vista Officer's Signature] [Title] [Date] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM NUMBER 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
acicgcu.uuinivmii - oicvcn vani^cnmisiiui v. visia. ounuui iiups;//iiiaii.guugiexuiii/iiiaii/rLU=z<5CiK=Z0UH-0/^^H-D6CView=pi<KCai= 
^ • H n " IL^^Ji k j^ 1 « Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com> ema&m UsT-i m m 
byCoGgk* 
Steven Van Den Eikhof v. Vista School 
5 messages 
Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com> Wed, May 19, 2010 at 5:20 PM 
To: Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com> 
Cc: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com> 
Bryan, please see attached PDF documents pertaining to the Van Den Eikhof case. The originals will follow in 
the mail. Thank you. 
J. Gregory Hardman 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
Tonaquint Business Park, Building B 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Office: (435) 628-3688 





« U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer.pdf 
Id 28K 
A Certificate of Service - U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer.pdf 
m22K Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests.pdf 
406K 19 
Certificate of Service - Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests.pdf 19 25K 
Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com> Fri, May 21, 2010 at 11:35 AM 
To: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com> 
Sorry Greg. This is far too low. If you can triple this, we can get a deal done. 
They have to know at this point that they are totally screwed on the breach of contract claim. That claim alone 
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Anyway, thanks for the offer. Talk to you soon. 
Bryan 
[Quoted text hidden] 
Bryan T. Adamson, 
Attorney at Law 
The Justice Firm, LLC 
205 E. Tabernacle, Suite 2 
St. George, UT 84790 
(435) 986-8386 [office] 
(435) 628-7844 [facsimile] 
Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com> Fri, May 21, 2010 at 12:19 PM 
To: Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com> 
Cc: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com> 
Bryan: 
If you are saying by your email below that your client is unwilling to settle for less than $20,000, I suspect the 
School will want to proceed with the litigation. I respectfully disagree with your assessment of the contract 
claim. The "offer letter" suggested by its terms that the amounts of compensation and benefits were 
unresolved issues and your client's several emails and discussions with School personnel thereafter suggest 
that your client likewise held this understanding. If so, there was never a meeting of the minds sufficient to 
form a contract. 
Nonetheless, I will have forwarded your email to the School's Board of Directors and will let you know how they 
want to proceed. Perhaps we will have to go through some discovery before the evidence will develop to the 
point where we can clarify some of these disputed factual and legal issues. 
Thanks. 
J. Gregory Hardman 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
Tonaquint Business Park, Building B 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
Office: (435) 628-3688 
Direct Dial: (435)215-4547 
From: Bryan Adamson rmailto:badamson@dixieleqal.coml 
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2010 11:36 AM Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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To: Gregory Hardman 
Subject: Re: Steven Van Den Eikhof v. Vista School 
[Quoted text hidden] 
Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com> Fri, May 21, 2010 at 2:00 PM 
To: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com> 
Greg, 
That is correct. My client will not settle for less than $20,000. I think you all need to seriously consider the 
wake of destruction left by Goodman. I assume you know he is no longer working there and no longer has an 
incentive to fabricate what he did. The offer letter had the terms in it and my client just wanted to find out if the 
state had ponied up their $4,200 or not. There had been an offer (or an offer to offer) as well as acceptance. 
Even if my client was not informed enough to understand the offer, the meeting of the minds had already taken 
place. You cannot undo a signed contract with later confusion. 
I will be submitting an MSJ on the contract issue next week. Maybe that will let the school know where they 
stand a little better. Besides we both know that $20k is not much more than they will pay to defend this 
anyway. 
Let me know. 
Bryan 
[Quoted text hidden] 
Bryan Adamson <badamson@dixielegal.com> Wed, Jun 2, 2010 at 3:22 PM 
To: Gregory Hardman <GHardman@snowjensen.com> 
Greg, 
My client just got hired on with the District for next year. Since he missed a year due to Vista, he is again 
considered a first year teacher. This is a loss in wages to him of over $30,000 over the years to come. 
In addition, we just found another teacher who is very unhappy with Vista and Steve Goodman. She had been 
told by Steve Goodman that if she would help develop the fine arts curriculum that he would hire her. Of 
course, she completed her portion of the work and they used her curriculum, but they refused to hire her. 
I don't think the school board realizes what they are getting into with this. If this thing goes to trial and they 
lose, they can expect a dozen or more suits to follow right on the heals of this one. 
Just a thought. 
Bryan 
[Quoted text hidden] 
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Tyson C Horrocks [12557] 
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B 
1600 South 912 West, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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Facsimile (435) 628-3275 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN VAN DEN EIKHOF, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VISTA SCHOOL, A UTAH PUBLIC 
CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 090503847 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
Defendant Vista School, a Utah Public Charter School (hereinafter '"Defendant"), by and 
through its counsel of record, J. Gregory Hardman and the law firm of Snow Jensen & Reece, 
and pursuant to Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby submits its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The motion, memorandum and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law (emphasis added). 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to 
file such a response (emphasis added). 
Examination of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates that every 
assertion of an undisputed material fact was supported in accordance with Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment sets forth an explanation as to the timing and 
sequence for the filing of Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents (hereinafter "Defendant's First Discovery Request") and 
attached thereto and incorporated by reference copies of Defendant's First Discovery Request 
(Aff. Hardman, Ex. 1) and the corresponding Certificate of Discovery (Aff. Hardman, Ex. 2). 
Therefore, each of the deemed admitted Requests for Admissions then became undisputed 
material facts that Plaintiff had an obligation to oppose by affidavit or as otherwise provided by 
Rules 56(c) and (e). 
Conversely, examination of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Plaintiffs Opposition Memo") reveals that it is not 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment 
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supported by any affidavits, references to Defendant's pleadings, or any other form of evidence 
required under Rule 56(c) to properly oppose a motion for summary judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that once the moving party on a motion for 
summary judgment has properly established "a prima facie case for summary judgment," the 
opponent of the motion "must file responsive affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial 
court's conclusion that there are no factual issues." Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also Bush Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 
1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). 
Since Plaintiffs Opposition Memo is facially defective, the Court may properly disregard 
Plaintiffs "Facts in Dispute" and enter summary judgment in favor of Defendant because the 
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(inclusive of its citations to the deemed admitted Requests for Admissions) establishes a prima < 
facie case for summary judgment. 
The language of Rule 56(e) is clear: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at 1044 (emphasis added). 
\ 
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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S "FACTS IN DISPUTE" 
As explained above, Plaintiffs "Facts in Dispute" must be entirely disregarded 
because they are not properly supported as required by Rules 56(c) and (e). However, 
since the principal assertion within Plaintiffs "Facts in Dispute" is actually a legal 
argument—namely, that Defendant's First Discovery Request was "never properly 
served"—Defendant will respond to the contentions underpinning Plaintiffs argument. 
First, Plaintiff (specifically Plaintiffs counsel) acknowledges having received the 
May 19, 2010 email from Defendant's counsel to which was attached Defendant's First 
Discovery Request. Utah courts have held that "actual notice of discovery requests is 
sufficient to invoke" [an obligation to make a timely response]. Aurora Credit Serv., Inc. 
v. Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, ^4, 129 P.3d 287 (citing Morgan v. 
Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997) (affirming the trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiff s claims under mle 37 where plaintiff "admitted that he received the 
discovery requests as well as the motion to compel" because it was "disingenuous for 
[plaintiff] to ... argue that he was not aware of his obligation to respond"); Utah Dep 't 
Tramp, v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995) (affirming default judgment against 
defendant under rule 37, even though defendant denied receiving some of the discovery 
motions, because defendant "was given ample notice of the proceedings against him and 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment 
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his obligations under the law5')). Thus, Plaintiffs contention that email notice was an 
insufficient form of service is misplaced. 
Second, Plaintiff suggests, and specifically states elsewhere in his brief without 
citation to any legal authority, that Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits 
service by email. Rule 5 says no such thing. In fact, Rule 5(b) specifically provides as 
follows regarding service by email: 
If a party is represented by an attorney service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. [....] Otherwise, a party 
shall serve a paper under this rule: upon any person with an electronic filing 
account who is a party or attorney in the case by submitting the paper for 
electronic filing: by sending it by email to the person's last known email address 
if that person has agreed to accept service by email; ... 
Defendant acknowledges that Rule 5(b)(l)(A)(ii) requires some sort of an agreement to accept 
service in this format; however, the rule itself is silent as to any special form the agreement must 
take,2 Plaintiffs counsel's email, dated May 21, 2010 at 11:3 6 AM, which is attached to the 
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, was a direct 
response to Defendant's counsel's May 19, 2010 email to which was attached Defendant's First 
Discovery Request. Throughout the entirety of these proceedings the parties' counsel have 
communicated via email. In fact, Plaintiffs counsel's May 21 email contains a specific response 
1
 Defendant strongly disputes Plaintiffs contention that Defendant's First Discovery Request was not properly 
served by regular U.S. Mail as indicated in the corresponding Certificate of Discovery. As set forth in the Affidavit 
of J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, a courtesy copy of which is attached 
hereto, all inferences regarding service of Defendant's First Discovery Request must be resolved in Defendant's 
favor for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly oppose by affidavit the factual assertion in the 
Affidavit of J. Gregory Hardman in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that service was proper; { 
and (2) all of the documentary evidence attached to the Affidavit of J. Gregor}' Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Sanctions strongly suggests there was proper sendee by U.S. Mail. 
2
 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 state: "While it is not necessary to file the written consent with the court, 
it would be advisable to have the consent in the form of a stipulation suitable for filing and to file it with the court." 
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and rejection of Defendant's U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer, which was also attached to 
Defendant's counsel's May 19 email along with a transmittal letter also dated May 19, 2010, 
which, among other things, stated: 
Lastly, I have also enclosed herewith Defendant's First Set of Requests for 
Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and a 
copy of the corresponding Certificate of Discovery, which original Certificate of 
Discovery is now on file with the Court. In an effort to move this matter along, 
the Vista School Board requested that I propound these discovery requests, should 
your client decline Vista School's U.R.C.P. 68 Settlement Offer (emphasis 
added). 
See Aff. J. Gregory Hardman in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, % 13 and Exhibit 
2, p. 2, attached thereto. 
ARGUMENT 
In the Argument section of Plaintiff s Opposition Memorandum, Plaintiff first contends 
that Defendant's First Discovery Request was improperly served. This argument has been 
refuted above, 
Plaintiff next cites U.R.C.P. 26(g) and then suggests that Defendant should be sanctioned 
for refusing to withdraw its Motion for Summary Judgment. Since Plaintiff has also filed a 
Motion for Sanctions, Defendant will respond to the specific arguments in said motion. 
Thirdly, Plaintiff attempts to argue that even if the Requests for Admissions are deemed 
admitted there remain questions of fact regarding the formation of a contract. Plaintiffs 
oversimplified analysis focuses upon particular sections of the April 29, 2009 letter from 
Defendant to Plaintiff. What Plaintiff fails to recognize that is that he bears the burden of proof 
on each of the elements necessary to form a legally enforceable contract. As explained in 
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Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, deemed admitted 
Requests for Admissions 1 through 7 conclusively establish Plaintiffs failure to address the 
necessary elements to form a legally binding employment agreement. As such, there are no 
remaining questions of fact. Plaintiffs breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs forth argument simply makes reference to yet another motion Plaintiff has 
filed—Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions. Defendant will respond to this 
motion in a separate brief. 
Plaintiffs remaining arguments respond to Defendant's effort to obtain summary 
judgment on all of Plaintiff s tort claims and claims for exemplary and punitive damages, all of 
which, in their present iteration, are prohibited by various sections of the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah. Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend his prior pleadings, seeking to 
name one of Defendant's former employees and an independent contractor as additional parties 
and charge them with the particular torts and claims for exemplary and punitive damages that 
Plaintiff inappropriately asserted against Defendant. However, if the deemed admitted Requests 
i 
for Admissions stand, this motion too will fail since many of the deemed admitted Requests for 
Admissions defeat the required elements of these tort claims. Defendant will address the 
propriety of Plaintiff s proposed First Amended Complaint as part of its memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint. 
In the final paragraph of Plaintiff s Argument section he seems to be arguing by his 
statement "because [Plaintiffs] cause [es] of action [and claims for infliction of mental anguish ' 
and negligent misrepresentation are] based in contract" that none of his tort claims are barred by 
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the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah because they are all based in contract. Plaintiff fails to 
cite any legal support for this assertion. The most direct counter to this assertion is found within 
the very section of the Governmental Immunity Act cited by both parties: Utah Code Ann. §63G-
7-301(5)(b).3 Subsection (b) was cited by Defendant for its express prohibition of claims for 
injuries resulting from infliction of mental anguish. However, the immediately preceding type of 
prohibited claim in this subsection is "interference with contract rights." What are Plaintiffs tort 
causes of action if they are not claims alleging interference with alleged contractual rights? Had 
the Legislature intended the result suggested by Plaintiff this reservation of immunity of claims 
for "interference with contract rights" would not be part of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Having thoroughly countered all of the arguments in Plaintiffs Opposition 
Memorandum, Defendant requests that the Court grant its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this A 2 ^ r i a y of August 2010. 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
in 
Tyson "C Horrocks 
Attorneys for Defendant Vista School 
J
 In the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant quoted subsection (b) 
instead of referenced subsection (a). Plaintiff perpetuated this mistake in his Memorandum in Opposition. The 
Governmental Immunity Act's preservation of immunity for injuries resulting from infliction of mental anguish and 
interference with contract rights is found in subsection (b). 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the QS day of August 2010,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be delivered via first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Bryan T. Adamson, Esq. 
THE JUSTICE FIRM, L.L.C. 
205 East Tabernacle, Suite 2 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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090503847 10-20-10 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT - ST, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2010 
9:39 A.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
it ic "k 
THE COURT: We have motions hearings in the case of 
Steven Van Den Eikhof versus Vista School. Mr. Adamson, 
Mr. Hardman are here, and you have someone. 
MR. HARDMAN: Yes, Your Honor. This is Carl 
Asherman. He's a member of the board of trustees of Vista 
School. 
THE COURT: Okay. I received a binder with 
2-and-3/8 inches of material. I have read it all. I have 
spent quite a bit of time on it. I don't need to have any of 
that repeated for me. I will, I think, go straight to the 
motions for summary judgment with anything additional either 
attorney may have to say on the motions for summary judgment. 
The plaintiff's motion was filed first so, 
Mr. Adamson, go ahead. 
MR. ADAMSON: Your Honor, plaintiff's motion, if 
you've read everything, you have our argument essentially. 
It's just that a contract — as a matter of law, the Court 
should decide whether or not a contract existed. We've got 
this letter that essentially — not essentially, expressly 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 
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090503847 10-20-10 
says offer of employment on it. My client signed it, 
returned it, and we argue that that is, as a matter of law, a 
contract, and it's really that simple. 
The defendant has argued that it's an offer to 
offer, and we could go into that, but as a matter of law, I 
think the Court can decide whether or not a piece of paper 
that says this is an offer of employment was indeed an offer 
of employment. 
THE COURT: Okay. On the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, Mr. Hardman, anything you want to say on 
that? 
MR. HARDMAN: Well, before doing so, are you 
interested in — we've, I think, thoroughly briefed all the 
responsive issues to the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, but in regards to — just as a point of 
counterargument, in regards to this — 
THE COURT: Is this something I've read about quite 
a lot? 
MR. HARDMAN: Okay. I think it probably is, so 
I'll spare you the recitation of those details. 
The plaintiff's motion for — excuse me, the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment is premised in two 
parts, as the Court knows. First has to do with the 
defective plaintiff's failure to respond to the request for 
admissions, and then the second component to the defendant's 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 3 
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motion for summary judgment has to do with numerous defects 
in the plaintiff's pleadings as it relates to governmental 
immunity statute. 
I think we've very clearly and succinctly addressed 
all of those issues, and if the Court, as indicated, has 
thoroughly reviewed all that material, I don't know that we 
could offer anything further to elicit any of the things that 
we've set forth therein. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything that needs to be said 
on any of the other motions, the motion to strike an 
affidavit, the motion to amend or withdraw admissions, motion 
for sanctions, motion to amend the Complaint. Anything that 
I haven't seen on that? 
MR. ADAMSON: One thing that you haven't seen, Your 
Honor, is that for some reason they were not getting the mail 
we sent, we were not getting the mail they sent. We have 
since started sending everything to their law firm via 
certified mail. Since then we've had no problems, so I don't 
know what the problem was with USPS before that, but since 
we've sent everything return receipt requested, everything 
has arrived. And this really hinges on the entire motion for 
summary judgment as to whether or not that magically arrived 
in my office, even though no one saw it, no one clocked it 
in, it never hit the file, and we didn't see it until the 
motion. So that's the only thing that's not been briefed 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 4 
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that since we began sending everything certified return 
receipt, we seem to have no problem with the mail. 
MR. HARDMAN: If I may, Your Honor, one matter I 
would like to bring to the Court's attention has to do with 
plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint. Since this was 
the plaintiff's motion, I opposed it, and in reply to the 
defendant's opposition memorandum, the plaintiff made 
reference to the case of Bingham v Roosevelt. I didn't 
notice whether the Court brought — whether Your Honor 
brought the binder in with you, but if you have — do you 
have the binder with you? 
THE COURT: No, I'm not going to risk work-related 
injuries by trying to bring that in here. 
MR. HARDMAN: If I may, Your Honor, I think it 
bears some clarification. In plaintiff's reply memorandum, 
they suggest that this continuing torts theory, as discussed 
in the Bingham versus Roosevelt case, has application to toll 
the statute of limitations in reference to the governmental 
immunity issues. It's our position, Your Honor, that that is 
a misapplication of Bingham v Roosevelt, and because it was a 
reply brief in which they identified this case for the first 
time, we did not have the benefit of a response. 
But I would point out I think it's very important 
to note that from the text of this case as it discusses the 
application of the continuing tort doctrine as a vehicle to 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 5 
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essentially not really toll the statute of limitations 
because compliance with the governmental immunity statutes 
notice requirement is a jurisdictional issue. It's not a 
statute of limitations issue as we've discussed in our 
briefing. 
And so that distinction bears clarification because 
it was in my opinion overlooked by the defendant in its reply 
brief to our opposition memorandum. Again, the plaintiff 
seems fixated on the analysis it's a statute of limitations 
issue which it is not. It's jurisdictional, meaning the 
Court doesn't even have jurisdiction to receive the pleading, 
determine whether it's appropriate, et cetera, if those 
threshold requirements were not met. 
But in regards to the suggestion whether it's as a 
statute of limitations issue or a jurisdictional issue that 
somehow this continuing tort theory has application, if the 
Court wants to make a note of Paragraph 57 of the case — 
this is a new case just recently handed down by the Utah 
Supreme Court in May 2010 so it has the paragraph references. 
Paragraph 57 states as follows. And, of course, in this 
particular case it was a continuing tort was a trespass claim 
occasioned by a municipality's accessing of an aquifer which 
reduced the pressure of water available to agricultural users 
in the area. 
And so that was the context of the continuing tort, 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 6 
-i •— -i -^« ^ » / n / 0 T-.T /"^ » _ _7 _ _ - /~*i J A r rr-n O / I T O ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
090503847 10-20-10 
but the application of this doctrine or the analysis of its 
application, the Supreme Court said the following. Again, 
this is Paragraph 57. "In the context of nuisance and 
trespass, we have considered conduct to be the continuing 
tort where the conduct may be discontinued at any time. 
Furthermore, we have classified a trespass as either 
permanent or continuing by looking solely at the act 
constituting the trespass and not at the harm resulting from 
the act." 
In the plaintiff's reply memorandum, he 
acknowledges that the act was the alleged repudiation of this 
purported contract. That would be the act itself. And yet 
he suggests in his briefing that his subsequent efforts to 
try and sell property to cover the loss of wages or efforts 
to find replacement employment or things of that nature 
constitute repeated torts by the school. That's not what 
this case stands for, nor is that the proper application of 
the continuing tort doctrine. 
Again, the court says, "Because multiple trespasses 
give rise to multiple causes of action, the statute of 
limitations begins to run anew with each act. Accordingly, 
we have characterized the trespass as permanent when the act 
or acts of trespass have ceased to occur." 
It's our position that the act — the tort act at 
issue was the alleged repudiation of the contract. That 
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occurred in or about early to mid-August of 2009, Everything 
that followed thereafter was the alleged harm that resulted 
from the act. Those harms are not continuing torts, and so I 
would encourage the Court to apply that analysis as very 
clearly explained by Utah Supreme Court in this Bingham v 
Roosevelt City case and disregard that analysis in the 
plaintiff's reply memorandum because it's inapplicable to the 
arguments at issue. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Anything on that 
point? 
MR. ADAMSON: Just this, Your Honor. That's only 
an alternative argument, albeit it's in a gray area regarding 
continuing torts. The fact of the matter is is whether or 
not the plaintiff properly — if the plaintiff's Complaint 
was properly pled in the first place with particularity. 
It's our argument is there's no need to amend the Complaint 
in the first place, but in the alternative if the Complaint 
is found deficient then we would argue that we should be able 
to amend. 
THE COURT: Weil, as I said, I spent quite a lot of 
time on this and made, as I usually do as I review motions, 
made my handwritten notes and then made some summary notes of 
rulings on the various motions, and I tried to put these in 
the order that they should come in order to relate to each 
other appropriately. 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 8 
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Starting with the defendant's motion to strike the 
plaintiff's affidavit, the defendant is correct; the 
affidavit was not timely filed; yes, it does need to be filed 
with the memorandum it supports, A memorandum in support of 
summary judgment is required to include citations to 
affidavits, discovery matter or other relevant materials. 
Can't refer to relevant materials that don't exist until 
later. It has to be filed with the memorandum it supports. 
The affidavit also is largely inadmissible under 
Rule 56(e) for the reasons described in the defendant's 
memorandum. The plaintiff cites little or no authority for 
the arguments regarding striking the affidavit. The motion 
is well-taken, and the motion to strike is granted. 
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on 
breach of contract fails to meet the requirements of Rule 7, 
specifically Rule 7(c)(3)(A). There's no supporting 
affidavit. There are exhibits referred to but not attached 
and I still haven't seen. They're not otherwise provided. 
The plaintiff's motion also quotes from a 
long-outdated version of Rule 56(a) and quotes language that 
existed some years ago but is not current. There's no 
citation to relevant materials to support seven out of the 
plaintiff's 15 statements of fact. Unfortunately the motion 
and the reply include very unprofessional language used by 
plaintiff's attorney, mocking opposing counsel and accusing 
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opposing counsel of fabrication. 
In the face of that, all of those things, the Court 
could not possibly determine there are no genuine issues of 
material fact or that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. That finding or conclusion must be 
reached in order to grant summary judgment, so the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. 
The plaintifff s motion to amend or withdraw 
admissions comes next. The supporting memorandum is a bit 
thin. The opposing memorandum is very thorough with an 
extensive analysis of the Langeland case and the application 
to the situation. The opposing memorandum correctly 
demonstrates that the plaintiff's motion is insufficient for 
consideration. The plaintiff failed to introduce evidence by 
affidavit or otherwise of specific facts showing any 
admissions to be untrue. 
The Langeland case is interesting to me in that it 
follows through the thought process that we all have when we 
first read what is said in rules about the amendment and what 
is said in prior cases about the amendment, and those 
standards are not just simply lightweight, superficial 
things, but they actually have some substance to them. And 
the plaintiff's memorandum simply does not show the specific 
facts regarding any admissions being untrue that is required 
to show that the presentation of the merits would be aided by 
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granting the motion. 
Again, the plaintiff's reply memorandum is highly 
unprofessional asserting that the defendant, quote, either 
made a mistake or tried to trick plaintiff, end quote. And 
then finally at that late point, the plaintiff tried to 
include affidavits. That's improper in a reply memorandum. 
The party's not allowed to meet its initial burden by waiting 
until opposing counsel responds and then doing what was 
required in the first place. 
I find the preponderance of the evidence as 
distinguished from argument and insult shows that defendant's 
discovery was served on plaintiff's attorney by mail. The 
evidence in that regard is just much too clear to ignore. 
The evidence proves conclusively that the plaintiff received 
the discovery request by e-mail, and the appellate courts 
have held that having this notice of this sort, not 
specifically e-mail but clear actual notice that discovery 
requests were present, gave the plaintiff a duty to respond 
in some way, to do something other than just nothing. But 
the plaintiff failed to respond in any way, and according to 
the long-standing rule, the request for admissions are deemed 
admitted. Consequently plaintiff's motion to amend or 
withdraw admissions is denied. 
On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the 
defendant has 32 statements of fact all from the request for 
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admissions, and according to Utah law those are conclusively 
proved. Plaintiff's opposing memorandum attempts to dispute 
two of the asserted facts which, if done correctly, might 
prevent summary judgment. The plaintiff, however, offers no 
citation to any affidavit, any discovery or any other 
relevant materials. The plaintiff also includes more 
unprofessional language. No genuine issue of material fact 
appears in regard to defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
On the legal issues, the governmental immunity both 
because of substance and because of plaintiff's failure to 
file the — I won't say it's meaningless, but the meager $300 
undertaking I conclude bars the plaintiff's claims. The 
defendant's analysis of those issues is very thorough. The 
response to it is just simply insufficient. I conclude 
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and so 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
As to the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, 
plaintiff cites no legal basis for sanctions to be 
considered. The defendant introduces the plaintiff to the 
Rule 11 basics, and the plaintiff's reply is the most 
disappointing and unprofessional yet. In all capital 
letters, quote, plaintiff's counsel knows for a fact that 
discovery was not sent, end quote. I find that to be an 
outrageous, unprofessional statement with no basis in fact. 
And ironically, as I once suggested in an article I 
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wrote for the bar journal, filing a motion for sanctions like 
this would actually give the defendant a valid motion for 
Rule 11 sanctions. I'm not doing it today on the Court's own 
initiative under Rule 11(c)(1)(b) only because I've spent 
enough time on this matter already. Plaintiff's motion for 
sanctions is denied. 
Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint is the 
last of those. Neither party explained the statute of 
limitations issue sufficiently for me to understand. There 
was a lot of language suggesting a knowledge of things that I 
didn't know about. Dates were thrown around; I didn't know 
what those dates related to. I just didn't find a complete 
explanation of the statute of limitations issue. However, it 
appeared to me that the Amended Complaint would include 
claims on which the Court has now granted summary judgment, 
and it is not clear that the plaintiff has complied with the 
Governmental Immunity Act in order to file a Complaint in the 
first place. I'd have to be persuaded the plaintiff had done 
that to approve any amendment. And from the discussion today 
it appears that the continuing tort doctrine is probably 
inapplicable to this case. Under all those circumstances, 
the plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint is denied as 
proposed. 
Did I miss any motions that were in the binder that 
you expected a ruling on? 
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MR. HARDMAN: Weil, the only other motion that's 
now moot is the stipulated motion to suspend our case 
management plan pending the outcome of these proceedings, but 
if the Court's ruling on the summary judgment — or 
defendant's summary judgment, I think that's now rendered 
moot. 
THE COURT: I thought the same thing when I got to 
that down at the bottom of the binder. 
MR. HARDMAN: If I may, Your Honor, in response to 
the Court's observation that neither party very clearly 
explained the statute of limitations issue as it relates to 
plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint, I think the reason 
the defendant didn't focus on that is because that really 
isn't the analysis. As I explained and as discussed 
previously, it's a jurisdictional issue, and the plaintiff 
has acknowledged that the only writing that could conceivably 
come within the ambit of what might qualify as a governmental 
immunity notice of claim was this November 20, 2009, letter, 
and that letter doesn't — that letter very specifically 
states that the plaintiff is bringing its claims against 
Vista School and no one else. 
And for that reason — the plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint seeks to add additional parties and claims against 
those additional parties, and if that notice was technically 
insufficient, which it was, then it's a jurisdictional issue, 
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not a statute of limitations issue, and that Complaint is 
barred. 
And because we're now well beyond the one-year time 
period from the accrual of the action the plaintiff contends 
gives rise to a claim, any subsequent attempt to file an 
Amended Complaint against any employee of Vista School or to 
add any new claims against any employee or against Vista 
School, except for potentially a contract claim that the 
Court has now since determined with its ruling on the summary 
judgment wouldn't apply, would be insufficient. 
So I don't know if that clarification helps, but I 
think the Court has before it all the necessary materials to 
determine that not only is plaintiff's motion to amend the 
Complaint denied as proposed, but it's denied, period. 
There's no — plaintiff has no continuing ability to bring 
claims against any employee of Vista School or any new claims 
against the school itself. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand the argument, but 
I'm not going that far for that reason. When I said it 
wasn't clear the plaintiff had complied with the Governmental 
Immunity Act, that's what I was talking about, and I'd have 
to be shown that there was jurisdiction of the court in order 
to entertain any Complaint and at this point an Amended 
Complaint. 
As to the statute of limitations, there again, I'm 
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not sure when particular things are supposed to have happened 
and how the time would be calculated from there. It was just 
a little bit light in that analysis, and now I understand 
why, but I'm not making any decision about any future 
Complaint. We'll just have to deal with that if it were 
filed — if something else were filed because I don't think I 
have enough of a basis to rule out any possible future 
Complaint. If you are correct in terms of the timing, then 
that would be a relatively short-lived matter as well, but I 
can't determine that now. 
MR. HARDMAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Adamson, I know you practiced in 
Texas, and that may be part of the reason for some of the 
language. I hear it most often when we have attorneys who 
have moved here from Las Vegas, because I know in Las Vegas 
this kind of extravagant figure-pointing sort of language is 
just the currency of the day apparently. It just doesn't fly 
in Utah, and I know it's argument, and it's heat of the 
moment and that sort of thing, but it never helps. 
MR. ADAMSON: I never write in the heat of the 
moment, and your criticism is well-taken. The whole thing 
was, you know, whether or not this discovery was ever sent, 
and albeit an e-mail saying it will be sent. 
(Multiple speakers.) 
MR. ADAMSON: — taking word for it, so it got very 
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frustrating. 
THE COURT: As I understood it, it was attached to 
the e-mail. 
MR. ADAMSON: It totally was, but I never opened 
it. He said it would follow in the mail. Why open it, print 
it. I just don't do that. 
THE COURT: I guess the answer why is the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals have both said, well, you 
know, if you knew there was discovery, you better do 
something about it. It seems a little harsh rule to most of 
us, but that's what they said. 
MR. ADAMSON: — dichotomy of don't use the 
Dallas, Texas, language but take opposing counsel's actions 
as Dallas, Texas. In other words, they may be trying to stab 
you and you have to protect yourself. Whether that was the 
case or not, I don't know, but we never got it. And I 
apologize. Criticism is well-taken. I'll calm down in the 
future. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Appreciate all the 
effort that's been put into this. It gave me a headache, but 
that's what it takes. 
MR. ADAMSON: I would like to know off the record 
did Your Honor find that there was a contract? 
THE COURT: No but that's only because for summary 
judgment purposes I'm really only looking to see if that 
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1 very, very high hurdle has been hit, 
2 MR. ADAMSON: Not for summary judgment. Just on 
3 the face of the four corners, off the record completely. 
4 THE COURT: I didn't even see it. It wasn't 
5 attached. It was attached to something later on. I think 
6 you attached a copy of it later. 
7 MR. HARDMAN: We attached the April 29th letter 
8 as an exhibit to our motions — or the briefs rather. 
9 MR. ADAMSON: Did the Court not get our notice of 
10 errata with the affidavits for that? 
11 THE COURT: No, I didn't. But there again, the way 
12 I that — this is something that you need to understand. The 
13 way that I apply summary judgment is according to the rules 
14 I as I read them. I understand that that's not going to be 
15 your experience everywhere. In particular if you go to the 
16 Court of Appeals, heaven only knows what their rules 
17 regarding summary judgment are. I have decisions by one 
18 particular now retired judge at the Court of Appeals 
19 making — essentially making fact findings in the course of 
20 | an appellate decision. Another one saying, oh, no, we'd 
21 never do that; we stick to the record presented to the trial 
22 court. 
23 I don't know what the rules are up there. It's a 
24 bit like when I began practice here in 1981, and we all had 
25 to try to just figure out what Judge Burns's rules were for 
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summary judgment because you couldn't read them anyplace. 
You just had to kind of sit in court and listen and watch and 
say, oh, I know what I have to do now. That was really 
frustrating. 
To me, summary judgment is pretty straightforward, 
and the motion and the supporting materials have to be all in 
order so that there's a record right there, because what 
we're doing with summary judgment is eliminating somebody's 
proverbial day in court, and I feel like if we're going to do 
that, then we've got to stick to that rule. And that's where 
the appellate court decisions really bother me because in the 
one case that I will never tire of talking about, the Pugh 
versus Dozzo case, if you want to read that you'll read about 
a suicide note and read that the suicide note was partially 
typed and partially handwritten, and they thought that was 
just wonderful evidence that, you know, turned the case. 
The problem is when the motion was filed, there was 
no suicide note, and I looked through all the materials that 
they filed for the motion, and there was no suicide note in 
them. And so when I wrote my decision, I wrote that the 
parties keep talking about a suicide note. It is not in 
evidence before the court. Well, all of a sudden it pops up 
in the Court of Appeals' decision. So I ordered those 
attorneys — and the one who had won the motion for summary 
judgment had lost her attorney by then — I ordered them to 
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1 come back and show me where these statements of the Court 
2 Appeals were in the record that they presented for their 
3 motion, and the party that prevailed on the appeal candidly 
4 admitted it wasn't anywhere. The note wasn't there. It was 
5 attached as an exhibit to a deposition transcript that was 
6 not in this court's file, but it got included in the record 
7 on appeal. 
8 And so in my view the Court of Appeals — we all 
9 know it's their law clerks — went dumpster diving through 
10 that file to try to find anything they could and ignored the 
11 standards of Rule 56 and Rule 7. And I had a correspondence 
12 I discussion with that judge about that, resulting in the next 
13 time she wrote a decision her saying we'd never look at 
14 I anything that wasn't presented to the trial court. It's a 
15 little late now, isn't it. 
16 So that's where I get my understanding of summary 
17 judgment practice; that the motion with the supporting 
18 materials has to show no genuine issue of material fact. By 
19 the same token, the reply only has to properly dispute one 
20 I stated fact, one essential fact, there's no summary judgment, 
21 That's what we have trials about when there's legitimate 
22 disputes. 
23 And so formally, the form of things is extremely 
24 important for summary judgment. In fact, I did — I have an 
25 outline of summary judgment procedures that I've revised 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 20 
i /r-J r* nnn r,7 r*,-.s-]->-^ nA-i-^r TIT Q/l ion 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
090503847 10-20-10 
several times. Now I'm going to speak to the Matheson Inn of 
Court in February on the same subject because it's been four 
or five years that just lays out this is what you have to 
have at this point in time. And it is very formal, and it's 
formalistic almost, but that's because we're doing such an 
extraordinary thing. We're saying there's not even any need 
to wait for trial. If this is what the case is, then the 
Court can determine this now. 
And I really hesitate doing that anytime it comes 
up, and I spent quite a lot of time looking to see, yeah, but 
isn't there a disputed issue of fact here? In fact, I 
remember one time somebody else was arguing the motion when 
Judge Eves came in, and he had a stack of courtesy copies 
like yours, and he came in and plopped it on the bench and 
said, Do you mean to tell me there's not one genuine issue of 
fact in there? And, you know, but that's the standard. If 
there is, it's out. If there's a question on the law, it's 
out. But that's why the memoranda have to be so clear 
because that's all that we get. That's all the record we 
have, and so if we're going to eliminate somebody's day in 
court, somebody's trial, it will have to be pretty lockstep 
in compliance with that rule. 
And Rule 7 and 56 have not been totally 
coordinated. They've been mostly, but 56 was all there was 
for many years, then Rule 7 was a great deal revised, and 
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that's where we ended up with the real — the other 
requirements for it. So 56 gives kind of broad standards and 
one particular specific standard; 7 gives the details. You 
have to just kind of read those together to get it. 
And so when I get to the point of a judgment — 
motion for summary judgment as to a contract matter, if I 
can't determine there's no genuine issue of fact, then that's 
as far as I go. I don't go any farther and say, well, but 
what if. And so that's why I'm saying I didn't really read 
the contract to interpret it to determine whether it was a 
contract. 
MR. ADAMSON: Because we didn't cite to it in our 
memorandum in opposition. 
THE COURT: It wasn't cited. 
MR. ADAMSON: It was a lawyer issue, not a fact 
issue. 
THE COURT: Weil, I can't tell you if there's a 
fact issue. 
MR. ADAMSON: Right, but for you — 
THE COURT: But there was a form issue. The form 
wasn't there. I'm done. And I practiced — in my private 
practice I practiced summary judgment as much as possible 
because it's a great way to save money and get things 
resolved. And most of the time I would do discovery with the 
idea that everything I want discovery is material for a 
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summary judgment motion, so requests for admissions are first 
in line and interrogatories. Requests for documents all you 
do is get paper, and, you know, they're not too much use for 
summary judgment, but in summary judgment context the 
discovery is critical. 
There are also other things you just have to gather 
along the way about summary judgment affidavits, like the 
Webster versus Sill case which is one that says if a party 
has taken a position under oath one direction, he can't file 
a contradicting affidavit and create an issue of fact with 
himself essentially, and that's happened once in a while. 
You know, there will be a deposition taken, somebody says 
something clearly on the record. Then when summary judgment 
motion comes up, he files an affidavit that says something 
different. That's one of the things — it's not in the rule, 
but it's in a critical case, and you just have to know that 
you can't get away with doing that. 
I don't know. I've gone through different 
attitudes towards summary judgment, because at times I have 
concluded that there's no point in even considering summary 
judgment in the trial court because we don't know what the 
appellate courts will do. And if we don't know what they're 
going to do, why do we waste our time with it here. It 
becomes a — it's not an appeal. It becomes some sort of a 
de novo motion hearing if they're not going to pay attention 
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to the standards of the rules. And in their defense I think 
one of the things that happens on appeal is there will be new 
attorneys because somebody is mad about what their attorney 
did or didn't do, so it will be new attorneys, and nobody 
brings it up. Nobody points out to the appellate court, wait 
a minute, this was not even presented to the trial court. 
You can't consider that; it's not part of an appeal; this is 
something new. 
And they understand that. I mean, the appellate 
courts are good at that when there's a trial. If you were to 
have a trial and then on appeal say, oh, but there was a 
witness we couldn't get to trial, but here's his affidavit. 
No, we don't keep adding to the evidence on appeal. They'd 
never allow that, but they do on summary judgment. 
And, in fact, in about 2004 I think it was I did 
just a casual e-mail survey among all the district court 
judges in the state, and I just had three or four little 
questions about summary judgment, what's your experience. 
And one of them was when you see an appellate court decision 
on summary judgment, do you find the facts have changed 
significantly from when you heard about them. And several 
judges responded to that, and one judge from Salt Lake who 
never agrees with me on anything and we do not pass the time 
of day even, don't even acknowledge each other, she wrote 
back and said, yes, it happens all the time. 
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So it's been a common experience, but I think our 
only hope to use summary judgment for the good purposes it 
has is to follow the rule and make it clear why we're 
following the rule in motions and memoranda, in my rulings, 
and then what ever the appellate court does I guess it's up 
to them. 
MR. ADAMSON: Can I ask this about the 300? Does 
the file have record that that was paid? 
THE COURT: I think it does, yes. 
MR. ADAMSON: Is that a bond that's given once you 
lose a case? Can my client get that back? 
THE COURT: I don't know what that is. 
MR. ADAMSON: I don't either. 
MR. HARDMAN: It's supposed to be for the benefit 
of the governmental entity to recover some portion of costs 
expended in defending the case. 
THE COURT: That will go a long way. I don't know 
what to tell you. I don't know if there will be a motion to 
forfeit it or a motion to return it or what. I don't know. 
Then I'll find out. 
MR. HARDMAN: Do you intend to issue the written 
orders, or do we need to prepare them? 
THE COURT: You'll need to do them. 
MR. HARDMAN: That will be fine. I figured that 
would be the case but wanted to make certain of that. 
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don't. 
THE COURT: I wish I had time for that, but I 
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at 
10:16 p.m.) 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s : 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I , MARY BETH COOK, A CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS WERE TRANSCRIBED BY ME 
FROM AN AUDIO AND/OR VIDEO RECORDING FURNISHED BY THE FIFTH 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; 
THAT THE FOREGOING PAGES REPRESENT THE COMPLETE 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY THAT 
WERE HELD ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2 0 , 2010 , AND THAT SAID 
TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS ALL OF THE AUDIBLE TESTIMONY, OBJECTIONS 
OF COUNSEL AND RULINGS OF THE COURT. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT A RELATIVE OR 
EMPLOYEE OF ANY OF THE PARTIES OR COUNSEL INVOLVED IN SAID 
ACTION, NOR A PERSON FINANCIALLY INTERESTED IN THE ACTION. 
DATED: JANUARY 2 4 , 2011 
Mary B e t h Cook, CSR, RPR 
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Motion for Sanctions - BRYAN T ADAMSON 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions 
Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions - BRYAN T ADAMSON 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice of Errata (Motion to Amend Complaint) 
Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions 
(Certificate of Mailing Corrected) 
Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complain (Certificate of 
Mailing Corrected) 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Brief of Contract Claims 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims and Supporting 
Memorandum (Amended to Include Exhibits) - BRYAN T ADAMSON 
Ex Parte Motion to File Overlength Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment - JAMES G HARDMAN 
Reply to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims and Supporting Memorandum 
Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract 
Claims 
Request to Submit for Decision Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Oral 
Argument Requested 
Affidavit in Support of Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
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Document Title 
Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint 
Request for Oral Argument-Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of 
Contract Claims 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Steven Van Den Eikhof DTD August 25 2010 (aka 
Affidavit in Support of Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment) -
JAMES G HARDMAN 
Reply to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend or Withdraw 
Admissions 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions 
Reply to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions 
Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint 
Request for Oral Argument (Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions; 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions; and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint) 
Request to Submit for Decision (Defendants Ex Parte Motion to File Overlength 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Def Motion for Summary Judgment) 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit 
Amended Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
Amended Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions 
Amended Request to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach 
of Contract Claims 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit of Steven 
\/an Den Eikhof Dated August 25 2010 (aka Affidavit in Support of Response to 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment) 
Request to Submit for Decision (Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit of Steven 
^an Den Eikhof dated August 25 2010) (Oral Argument Requested) 
NOTICE OF PENDING MOTIONS 
Stipulated Motion and Order to Suspend Discovery Plan and Case Management 
Drder 
MOTIONS HEARING 
_etter from Counsel Re Submitted Orders 
Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
Drder Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Withdraw Admissions 
Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract 
Claims 
Drder Granting Defendants Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Steven Van Den 
Eikhof Dated August 25 2010 
Drder Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint 
Jotice of Intent to Appeal 
Jotice of Appeal 
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Document Title Entry Date Page Number 
Letter from Supreme Court and Order transferring to the Court of Appeals 01/20/2011 532 
(#20110037) 
TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 10-20-2010 01/26/2011 536 
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"Relating to" and "related to" include pertaining to, referring to, or having as their subject 
matter, directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly, the subject matter of a specific request. 
The word "and" includes the disjunctive, and "or" includes the conjunctive as necessary 
to attain the broadest response. 
Singular masculine pronouns have a nonrestrictive meaning and are used to refer to you 
or a person, as defined herein, of either gender. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
ADMISSION NO, 1: Please admit that the letter from Vista School, dated April 29, 
2009, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 (hereafter referred to as the "Vista Letter"), is a true and correct 
copy of the letter you received from Vista School. 
ADMISSION NO. 2: Please admit that the Vista Letter contained conditions that 
had to be fulfilled before you became an employee of Vista School. 
ADMISSION NO. 3: Please admit that the Vista Letter states that it did not serve 
as a formal employment agreement. 
ADMISSION NO. 4: Please admit that the Vista Letter states that you will 
complete a "hiring process." 
ADMISSION NO. 5: Please admit that the Vista Letter provides that you had to 
sign a Salary Agreement to formally accept employment from Vista School 
ADMISSION NO. 6: Please admit that you did not sign a Salary Agreement with 
Vista School. 
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ADMISSION NO, 7: Please admit that you were given an opportunity to sign a 
Salary Agreement on or about August 14, 2009. 
ADMISSION NO. 8: Please admit that the Vista Letter did not state you would 
receive additional compensation in the form of educator salary adjustments in excess of the stated 
base salary of $34,622. 
ADMISSION NO. 9: Please admit that the Vista Letter did not state that you would 
receive additional compensation beyond the stated base salary of $34,622 for attending 
professional development and training days. 
ADMISSION NO. 10: Please admit that you did not sign the Salary/Wage 
Agreement - Teacher attached as Exhibit F to your Complaint (hereafter the "proposed Salary 
Agreement"). 
ADMISSION NO. 11; Please admit that the proposed Salary Agreement provided 
for a salary of $35,626 after calculating in the Educator Salary Adjustments and compensation for 
attending professional development and training days. 
ADMISSION NO. 12: Please admit that the total amount of compensation in the 
proposed Salary Agreement exceeded the total amount of compensation stated in the Vista Letter. 
ADMISSION NO. 13: Please admit that you were compensated by Vista for the 
training referenced in Paragraph 25 on your Complaint. 
ADMISSION NO. 14: Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista 
reception as alleged in Paragraph 32 of your Complaint. 
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ADMISSION NO. 15: Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista 
teacher training as alleged in Paragraph 34 of your Complaint. 
ADMISSION NO. 16: Please admit that you were not required to attend the Vista 
teacher training alleged in Paragraph 38 of your Complaint. 
ADMISSION NO. 17: Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with 
any written agreement wherein you were offered 100% medical insurance benefits at no cost to 
you as alleged in Paragraph 39 of your Complaint. 
ADMISSION NO. 18: Please admit that you never signed nor were presented with 
any written agreement that stated that you would receive $1,389 a month in benefits as alleged in 
Paragraphs 21 and 69 of your Complaint. 
ADMISSION NO. 19: Please admit that you were not present to teach class at 
Vista School on the first day of the 2009-2010 school year. 
ADMISSION NO. 20: Please admit that you did not teach any classes during the 
2009-2010 school year. 
ADMISSION NO. 21: Please admit that you did not perform any work at the 
direction of Vista School following the first calendar day of the 2009-2010 school year. 
ADMISSION NO, 22: Please admit that no person associated with Vista School 
ever told you that you were "terminated" as alleged in Paragraph 53 of your Complaint. 
ADMISSION NO. 23: Please admit that the 2009-2010 school year was the first 
year of operations for Vista School 
ADMISSION NO. 24: Please admit that you never held the position of classroom 
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teacher at Vista School. 
ADMISSION NO. 25: Please admit that you never held the position of mentoring 
teacher at Vista School. 
ADMISSION NO. 26: Please admit that you have not had a teacher evaluation 
administered by Vista School. 
ADMISSION NO. 27: Please admit that you did not receive a satisfactory rating or 
above on a teacher evaluation administered by Vista School. 
ADMISSION NO. 28: Please admit that you exchanged written communications 
with employees or representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to actually 
receiving the proposed Salary Agreement. 
ADMISSION NO. 29: Please admit that you exchanged verbal communications 
with employees or representatives of Vista School regarding your compensation prior to actually 
receiving the proposed Salary Agreement. 
ADMISSION NO. 30: Please admit that you were made aware on or before 
August 2, 2009 that Vista School's proposed Salary Agreement would be less than you had 
originally believed. 
ADMISSION NO. 31: Please admit that you had communications with a Vista 
School employee regarding your base salary on or before August 2, 2009. 
ADMISSION NO. 32: Please admit that George Washington Academy never 
presented you with a written offer of employment for the 2009-2010 school year. 
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